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OVERDUE JUSTICE: PEOPLE V. VALENZUELA
AND THE PATH TOWARD GANG
PROSECUTION REFORM
Ryan Nelson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, otherwise
known as the STEP Act (the “Act”), became law in 1988 in response
to the public safety concerns surrounding rising gang violence,
especially in Southern California.1 At first, it was designed to provide
prosecutors with an additional tool to target the leaders of large gangs
with extensive backgrounds in homicide and narcotics trafficking.2
But the STEP Act succumbed to the “tough on crime” era that
came soon after its passage. Eventually, its original intent was lost,
and the Act sprawled ever outward, aided by the California
legislature,3 the electorate,4 and a particularly punitive form of judicial
activism.5
This Comment will focus on that activism. It argues that even
with a newly sympathetic California Supreme Court, the STEP Act
has so far strayed from its original intent that reform requires a new
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Environmental
Sciences, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor Paul Hayden for
his support and feedback on this Comment. I would like to thank the staff and editors of the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review, especially Kelly Larocque and Jacob Nielson, for ensuring it was fit
to print. And I would like to thank my parents and friends for sacrificing their time to read it and
for their unending support.
1. J. Franklin Sigal, Comment, Out of Step: When the California Street Terrorism
Enforcement and Prevention Act Stumbles into Penal Code Limits, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1, 3 (2007).
2. Martin Baker, Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and Application of
California’s Anti-Gang STEP Act, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 101, 115 (2006).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 1988) (amended 1993, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2007,
2010, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2018).
4. Baker, supra note 2, at 115 (explaining that the electorate expanded the reach of the STEP
Act through Proposition 21 in the year 2000).
5. See People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 744 (Cal. 2001); People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d
278, 279 (Cal. 2000); People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 719 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other
grounds by People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016).
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legislative or electoral answer. Bringing justice to those affected by
gang violence while still protecting the rights of the accused may
require some judicial discretion; but, as will be shown, the labyrinth
of California case law surrounding the STEP Act has made it
untenable in its current form. Given the urgency of the matters
surrounding the law, fixing the STEP Act can no longer be left up to
judges and requires significant statutory reform.
The Comment will proceed as follows: first, it will illustrate how
the STEP Act works. Next, it will explore how a conservative
California Supreme Court, working in the tough-on-crime era of the
Act’s early years, expanded the Act’s reach beyond the original
legislative intent. Third, it will examine the structural issues with the
Act’s enforcement and the shifting attitudes toward criminal justice
reform that countered the Act’s expansion. And finally, it will examine
People v. Valenzuela,6 how this decision is distinguishable from prior
California Supreme Court jurisprudence, and what that means for the
Act’s future.
II. THE ACT
The STEP Act provides prosecutors with two tools to aid in their
fight against criminal street gangs: a stand-alone provision
criminalizing a person’s active participation in a gang7 and a
sentencing enhancement targeted at persons who commit crimes “for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal
street gang.”8
A. Subsection 186.22(a)
Subsection 186.22(a) is the stand-alone component of the Act.9 It
reads, in pertinent part, “Any person who actively participates in any
criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in, or
have engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully
promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by
members of that gang, shall be punished . . . .”10

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

441 P.3d 896 (Cal. 2019).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2014).
Id. § 186.22(b)(1).
See id. § 186.22(a).
Id.
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The Act defines “criminal street gang” and “pattern of criminal
gang activity” as well.11 In subsection 186.22(e), the statute lists
thirty-three eligible crimes.12 Under the STEP Act, a “criminal street
gang” is “any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary
activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts”13 listed
in subsection 186.22(e).14 That association of people must also “[have]
a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and [its]
members [must] individually or collectively engage in, or have
engaged in, a pattern of criminal gang activity.”15
In order to have a “pattern of criminal gang activity,” the person
charged under subsection 186.22(a) must know that group of three or
more people committed, planned to commit, or attempted to commit
any of those thirty-three crimes on two separate occasions within the
past three years.16
It is a maze of confusing statutory language. But the gist is: if a
prosecutor wants to charge someone with participating in a street gang
under subsection 186.22(a), the following must be proved:
1. The defendant was part of a group of three or more persons;
2. The group had a common identifying sign or symbol;
3. The group committed, tried to commit, or conspired to
commit most of the thirty-three crimes listed in 186.22(e), at
least twice, on different occasions, over a three-year period;
4. The defendant knew about these crimes; and
5. The defendant then helped the group engage in further
“felonious criminal conduct.”17
As will be elaborated later in this Comment, interpretation of
subsection 186.22(a) has proven difficult and is central to the decision
in People v. Valenzuela.18
B. Subsection 186.22(b)(1)
Subsection 186.22(b)(1) reads in pertinent part:
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. § 186.22(e)–(f).
See id. § 186.22(e).
Id. § 186.22(f).
Id. § 186.22(e)–(f).
Id. § 186.22(f).
Id. § 186.22(a), (e).
Id. § 186.22.
See People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 906 (Cal. 2019).
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[A]ny person who is convicted of a felony committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any
criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members,
shall, upon conviction of that felony, in addition and
consecutive to the punishment prescribed for the felony or
attempted felony of which he or she has been convicted, be
[additionally] punished.19
This subsection is an enhancement; it adds additional punishment onto
an established felony.
Subsection 186.22(b)(1) has also been subject to uneven
jurisprudence.20 While this Comment focuses its analysis specifically
on subsection 186.22(a)—as it was at issue in Valenzuela—
jurisprudence surrounding subsection 186.22(b)(1) remains complex
and unduly punitive. Some exploration of that will be discussed below.
III. THE EXPANSION
There is no dispute that a crime wave gripped California in the
1980s.21 The decade saw a historic peak of property crimes and a
consistently high rate of violent crimes.22 In a sign of the times, voters
ousted three California Supreme Court justices in the 1986 election,
all of whom had been squarely on the liberal end of the spectrum when
it came to criminal justice reform.23 The campaign against the justices
cited the justices’ lack of affection for the death penalty as a key reason
to vote them out.24 Following the election, Governor George
Deukmejian installed three new justices who would soon swing the
court to the right on nearly all matters in the state, including criminal
justice reform.25
Conventional thinking at the time linked much of the increase in
crime to violent street gangs—and the media played a huge role in
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2014).
20. See Martin Baker, Crips and Nuns: Defining Gang-Related Crime in California Under the
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 891, 897 (2009).
21. See Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Crime Trends in California, PUB. POL’Y INST.
CAL. (Oct. 2018), https://www.ppic.org/publication/crime-trends-in-california.
22. Id.
23. Claire Machado, Did the Politicalization of the Supreme Court Start in California?,
BERKELEY POL. REV. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2019/01/28/did-the-politicalizationof-the-supreme-court-start-in-california.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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defining that narrative. In February of 1988, the New York Times
declared Los Angeles “a simmering ethnic stew pot,” populated by
“black gangs” that held “disdain for human life.”26 In April of the same
year, the Washington Post announced the results of a “strike force”
that tore through Los Angeles’s “crime ridden neighborhoods.”27 The
Los Angeles Times, in June of 1988, documented a raid that netted 750
gang members and 1,524 total arrests.28 Then-Mayor Tom Bradley
promised to take back the streets of the City of the Angels from
“terrorists.”29
Then, in an emergency session in September of 1988, the
California legislature declared, “[T]he state of California is in a state
of crisis . . . .”30 From that hysteria the STEP Act was born.
But even amidst one of the worst crime waves in the state’s
history, the California legislature took great pains to ensure
prosecutions under the Act were difficult “except in the most egregious
cases.”31 As an example, the original STEP Act required that the
defendant charged as a member of a gang be fully aware the gang had
committed two of the statutorily defined “serious crimes” prior to the
conduct at issue.32 In 1988, there were all of seven “serious” crimes:
“assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury; robbery; homicide or manslaughter; sale,
manufacture, and possession for sale of narcotics; shooting at an
inhabited dwelling or occupied vehicle; arson; and witness and victim
intimidation.”33 And the original sponsor of the STEP Act concluded
those seven “extremely serious” crimes were “typical of street
gangs.”34
26. Robert Reinhold, Gang Violence Shocks Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 8, 1988), at A10,
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/08/us/gang-violence-shocks-los-angeles.html.
27. Jay Matthews, More than 600 Arrested in Anti-Gang Sweep by Los Angeles Police, WASH.
POST (Apr. 10, 1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/10/more-than600-arrested-in-anti-gang-sweep-by-los-angeles-police/ad53910b-81ba-4c32-a5127f9ed9458056.
28. Bettina Boxall, 750 Gang Members Arrested in 2-Night Sweeps, L.A. TIMES (June 13,
1988, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-06-13-me-3206-story.html.
29. Eric Malnic & Mark Arax, 1,000 Officers Stage Assault Against Violent Youth Gangs,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 1988, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-06-13-me3206-story.html.
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2019).
31. Baker, supra note 2, at 114 (quoting S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS: AB
2013, Record No. 29069, 1987–88 Reg. Sess., at 7 (Cal. 1988)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The sponsors also designed the Act to provide extra punishment
if, and only if, the prosecution could prove the affiliated gang
committed at least two serious crimes prior to the defendant being
charged under the STEP Act.35 Therefore, a defendant should have
only received an enhancement or a conviction under the STEP Act
after prosecutors proved the gang had committed, and the defendant
knew of, two of those defined “serious” criminal acts.36 The California
legislature took pains to indicate the STEP Act was a tool to be used
cautiously by prosecutors to take down serious criminals—loose
associations of neighborhood kids who tagged buildings with their
initials were, by and large, supposed to be excluded from the STEP
Act’s purview.37
IV. THE EXPLOSION: GARDELEY, CASTENADA, AND SENGPADYCHITH
The modesty would not last. Three cases in particular—People v.
Gardeley,38 People v. Castenada,39 and People v. Sengpadychith40—
interpreted several important parts of the STEP Act in a broader
manner than intended. These will be handled in order.
A. People v. Gardeley
In 1996, the newly-conservative California Supreme Court had
its first opportunity to interpret the STEP Act in People v. Gardeley.41
Gardeley was decided in the middle of the “tough on crime era.” Just
two years prior, California legislature passed its infamous “three
strikes law.”42 At the same time, its federal counterpart had similarly
passed its own “tough on crime” bill.43 Throughout the 1990s, the
STEP Act was continuously revised and expanded—and the list of

35. Id. at 114–15.
36. Id. at 115.
37. Id.
38. 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d
320 (Cal. 2016).
39. 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000).
40. 27 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2001).
41. See Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 715 (“At issue in this case are certain provisions of the Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, also known as the STEP Act, enacted by the
Legislature in 1988.”).
42. See
California’s
Three
Strikes
Sentencing
Law,
CAL.
CTS.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/20142.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
43. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1808
(1994).
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“serious” crimes ballooned from seven to thirty-three.44 The year 1996
was also the year of the “super predator”—the entirely made up, now
thoroughly discredited idea that group of evil crime-prone youths
would run wild in the streets45—an idea Hillary Clinton parroted in a
now infamous speech.46
It is no surprise then that in its first review of the STEP Act, the
California Supreme Court lowered the burden for prosecutors.
Previously, defendants were supposed to know of two serious
crimes—from a list of seven—that their counterparts had engaged in.47
Only after establishing knowledge of those two serious crimes could
the charges be enhanced.48
The Gardeley court reduced this burden by allowing prosecutors
to use the current charges levied against a defendant and his
accomplices to prove that knowledge.49 After Gardeley, if a defendant
knew of one previous incident, but was charged with two of the serious
crimes on the list found in the statute, one of those two could serve as
the foundation for meeting the knowledge requirement.50 The court
also declared the knowledge could be of “uncharged,” and therefore
unproven, crimes.51
Worse still, the California Supreme Court did so by hiding behind
a veneer of straight-faced legislative intent. The court noted prior
precedent required them to “construe penal laws as favorably to
criminal defendants as reasonably permitted.”52 But the court
demurred on that, arguing that policy only arises when the language
of the statute “is susceptible of two constructions.”53 The court instead
contended there was “no need for construction” as the plain-faced text

44. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2014).
45. John DiLulio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995,
12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-of-the-superpredators.
46. Ronda Lee, Why Hillary’s Super-Predator Comment Matters, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 11,
2016,
01:37
PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hillarys-superpredatorcomment_b_9655052.
47. See Baker, supra note 2, at 114–15.
48. See id.
49. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 726 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by People
v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 727; see Baker, supra note 2, at 115–16 (discussing how Gardeley lowered the
burden on prosecutors).
52. Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 724 (citing People v. Overstreet, 726 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Cal. 1986)).
53. Id. (quoting Overstreet, 726 P.2d at 1290).
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of the STEP Act sufficiently illustrated the “legislative intent” of the
statute.54 As such, the court drew its conclusion in Gardeley based
solely on the text of the Act.55
Given that Gardeley was a case of first impression, arguably
plenty of room existed for “two constructions” of any number of the
examined terms in the statute.56 The Gardeley court looked at a
number of subsections of the STEP Act: 186.22(b)(1), 186.22(e), and
186.22(f).57 Subsection 186.22(f) defines criminal street gangs as an
“ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more of the criminal acts,” in addition to
“having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol.”58
Interpretive issues abound—what defines a “primary activity” of a
group? What is a common name or symbol? Who decides how
common it is? In addition, subsection 186.22(b)(1) looks at one’s
“association” with a gang—what defines an association?59
This is not to say the Gardeley court should have, or even could
have, answered these questions. But given that it was a case of first
impression, the cautious thing to do would have been to explore the
legislative intent further. Instead, the court chose not to, claiming that
the legislative intent was obvious, and reached an erroneous decision
that ultimately harmed criminal defendants.
B. People v. Castenada
People v. Castenada was the next decision that reduced the
burden on the prosecution. Castenada came on the heels of
Proposition 21.60 Passed in March of 2000, Proposition 21 came in the
wake of the “super-predator” theory and not only enhanced criminal
punishment under the STEP Act but also enhanced juvenile
punishment throughout the state of California.61

54. Id. at 723.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 724 (quoting Overstreet, 726 P.2d at 1290).
57. Id. at 720.
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West 2014).
59. Id. § 186.22(b)(1).
60. See People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278, 279–80 (Cal. 2000).
61. Lizabeth N. De Vries, Comment, Guilt by Association: Proposition 21’s Gang Conspiracy
Law Will Increase Youth Violence in California, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 191, 192 (2002).
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Castenada also lowered the burden for the prosecution.
Previously, the First District Court of Appeal, in People v. Green,62
issued the controlling law for how “active” a gang member needs to
be to qualify for a stand-alone conviction under the STEP Act.63 Green
required the prosecution to prove a defendant “devot[ed] . . . a
substantial part of [their] time and efforts” to the street gang.64 The
defendant in Castenada argued that the Green decision effectively
required the prosecution to show that a defendant held a leadership
position in the gang.65
The high court disagreed, striking both of those standards, and
replacing it with a lower burden: participation need be only more than
“nominal or passive.”66
C. People v. Sengpadychith
The interpretation issues continued. In 2001, the California
Supreme Court decided People v. Sengpadychith.67 There, the court
grappled with how to define “primary activities” as it related to
subsection 186.22(e) of the STEP Act.68 It first offered that “primary
activity” be defined by requiring criminal conduct be the “principal”
occupation of the group.69 It also contended “consistent[] and
repeated[] . . . criminal activity” may establish criminal conduct as the
group’s “primary activity.”70 How could a prosecutor prove consistent
and repeated criminal activity? The court offered that potentially a
gang police officer could testify as an expert witness—an issue that
will become more apparent later.71
But there is another issue at play here. At the beginning of the
opinion, the court acknowledged its interpretation of subsections
186.22(e) and (f) again—even though in Gardeley, the court felt it
62. 278 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Ct. App. 1991), abrogated by People v. Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal.
2000).
63. Id. at 146; see also Castenada, 3 P.3d at 281 (acknowledging Green).
64. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
65. People v. Castenada, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 202 (Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, People v.
Castenada, 3 P.3d 278 (Cal. 2000).
66. Castenada, 3 P.3d at 284–85; see also Baker, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing the lowering
of the burden in Castenada).
67. See People v. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d 739, 741 (Cal. 2001).
68. Id. at 744.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 743 (citing People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 722 (Cal. 1996), abrogated on other
grounds by People v. Sanchez, 374 P.3d 320 (Cal. 2016)).
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required no additional materials to help interpret these subsections
because the legislative intent was apparent enough on the face of the
subsections.72 And, recall, that the Gardeley court specifically
eschewed precedent that would have required them to interpret the
STEP Act in the way most favorable to the criminal defendant because
the court felt the statute was easily understandable.73
But instead of acknowledging the mistake and acting more
cautiously, the California Supreme Court continued to operate in a
way that expanded the rights of the prosecutor over the accused. In
Sengpadychith, it did so again by focusing on the quantity of crimes
as opposed to the quality of crimes.74
V. RESISTANCE GROWS
It is no surprise that a conservative California Supreme Court
expanded the prosecution’s reach during the “tough on crime” era.
However, the foundation of the counter-revolution bubbled
underneath the general consensus on crime and punishment.
Sociological researchers continued to mount evidence that indicated
crime and gang-ridden areas did not need more police officers; they
needed more financial support, more investment, and more social
resources.75 In 1999, researchers from University of California, Los
Angeles published a study examining the relationship between
socioeconomic factors and gang violence.76 The study concluded that
low-income and lack of employment opportunities in communities
directly correlated with gang violence.77
Entering the new millennium, crime rates continued to drop in
California.78 Nevertheless, the state continued to lock up more
people.79 In the trenches, prosecutors and defense attorneys grappled
72. Id.at 741–42.
73. See Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 723 (Cal. 1996).
74. Sengpadychith, 27 P.3d at 744; see also Baker, supra note 2, at 116–17 (discussing the
problem with the court’s expansive definition of “primary activity”).
75. Chase Sackett, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime, DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV. OFF.
POL’Y DEV. & RES. (2016), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/summer16/
highlight2.html.
76. See Demetrios N. Kyriacou et al., The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Factors and
Gang Violence in the City of Los Angeles, 46 J. TRAUMA 334, 334 (1999).
77. Id.
78. Lofstrom & Martin, supra note 21.
79. DEP’T. JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., NCJ 188207, PRISONERS IN 2000 1, 4 (2001)
(explaining that by the year 2000, California had the most occupied prisons in the country with
inmate percentage growth of 70.4 percent).
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with an inconsistent and punitive judicial system when it came to gang
members. And the arbitrary nature of gang prosecutions—as well their
susceptibility to common human error—started making their evergrowing punishments harder and harder to justify.
Examining the process to prove a gang enhancement
demonstrates how, at every turn, ample room for human error exists.
It starts with the police identifying who is in a gang. For example,
according to the City of San Diego, there are nine criteria their officers
use in identifying potential gang members; of those nine, some include
frequenting gang areas and “be[ing] identified as a gang member by
an untested informant.”80
This expansive police discretion causes problems at the source.
Identified gang members are often added to a statewide database,
CalGang, enabling police to track an identified person’s movement
throughout the state.81 However, people often find themselves
incorrectly tagged as a gang member. Those who just happen to live
in gang territory or just happen to know someone in a gang are
frequently misidentified as gang members.82 Even gang
interventionists dedicated to preventing gang violence have been
identified as gang members by the database.83 In 2016, a state audit
found that “[l]aw enforcement agencies have failed to ensure that
CalGang records are added, removed, and shared in a way that
maintains the accuracy of the system and safeguards individuals’
rights.”84 The lax maintenance of the database came to its logical
conclusion in February of 2020, when the California attorney general
announced he would investigate the Los Angeles Police Department
after it was revealed that twenty officers had allegedly falsified
CalGang records.85
80. See Memorandum from the San Diego Police Dep’t on Frequently Asked Questions
Regarding Identifying Gangs and Gang Members, https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/
legacy/police/pdf/gangfaq.pdf.
81. See CAL. ST. AUDITOR, REP. 2015-130, CALGANG CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 1
(2016), https://auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2015-130.pdf.
82. See Ali Winston, You May Be in California’s Gang Database and Not Even Know It,
REVEAL
(Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/you-may-be-in-californias-gangdatabase-and-not-even-know-it/.
83. See Katie Flaherty, He’s a Gang Intervention Worker. But California Police Call Him a
Gang Member, NBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2019, 8:59 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/he-s-gang-intervention-worker-california-police-call-him-gang-n1043666.
84. CAL. ST. AUDITOR, supra note 81, at 36.
85. Leila Miller & Anita Chabria, California Attorney General to Investigate LAPD GangFraming Scandal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2020 1:57 PM),
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In the trenches, public defenders and prosecutors acknowledged
the same years before any published audit. In interviews from 2009,
public defenders pointed out several instances in which someone
accused of being in a gang was just from a neighborhood where it was
nearly impossible not to interact with gangs.86 In one example, the
childhood nickname of an unaffiliated person in the neighborhood
became that person’s presumed gang moniker because the police
assumed the nickname was gang related.87 District attorneys similarly
admitted that gang enhancements could be arbitrarily applied.88
Further, prosecutors explained that harsher penalties—added well
after the bill passed into law89—incentivized adding gang
enhancements as it made the proving the enhancements more worth
the trouble.90
These issues routinely spill over into court, where prosecutors are
permitted to introduce highly prejudicial, and oftentimes highly
speculative, gang affiliations and the testimony of expert “gang
cops.”91
All of this is to say that the path to a conviction under the STEP
Act remains uniquely fraught with opportunities for error. Every step
of the way, miscommunications, misunderstandings, socioeconomic
factors, and potentially flat out lies contribute to an overly-punitive
system.
A. People v. Albillar
Yet, in the face of growing criticism, judicial interpretation of the
law shifted only slightly. At the highest level, the case law remained
calcified until People v. Albillar92 in 2010. There, the California
Supreme Court examined the sentencing enhancement under
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-10/california-attorney-general-lapd-gangscandal-calgang.
86. Erin Y. Yoshino, California’s Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from Interviews
with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 127 (2008).
87. Id. at 128–29.
88. Id. at 133.
89. See Baker, supra note 2, at 105; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1)(A)–(C) (West
2014) (explaining mandatory minimums in enhancements).
90. See Yoshino, supra note 86, at 133.
91. Id. at 134; see also People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1085–89 (Cal. 2004) (permitting
the use of bifurcation in trials for criminal prosecutions and enhancements, but allowing gang
evidence as a form of character evidence that can be used even in trials not involving gang
membership).
92. 244 P.3d 1062 (Cal. 2010).
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subsection 186.22(b)(1) and considered whether a crime could be
committed by a group of gang members that were not acting for the
benefit of the gang.93
The California Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility that
a group of gang members may embark on a “frolic and detour” from
their association as gang members to commit a crime.94 The court even
offered that the defense may negate any finding of an enhancement
under the STEP Act.95 But the acknowledgement was a cautious one—
the court declared the defendants in Albillar were not on a “frolic and
detour.”96 Nevertheless, Albillar marked the first instance in decades
that the California Supreme Court provided criminal defendants a leg
to stand on, no matter how weak. After decades of throwing the book
at defendants, Albillar represented a potential softening of the punitive
judicial activism of old.
But a turning point had not come just yet. While that “frolic and
detour” language created a moment of inspiration, it was ultimately
futile. Scholars published thoughts on potential new legal standards
for proving gang enhancements97 and several defense attorneys
utilized the argument on federal habeas corpus petitions.98 But as of
this writing, the defense has never been successful.
B. Post Albillar
In the decade following Albillar, the dam on criminal justice
reform broke and a number of judicial, legislative, and electoral
reforms took hold in California. First came Brown v. Plata,99 handed
down by the United States Supreme Court in 2011, which forced
California to deal with its over-incarceration habit. Following Plata,
the California legislature passed AB 109—better known as
“realignment”100—which helped stem the tide by providing local

93. Id. at 1073.
94. Id. at 1072.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1072–73.
97. See Baker, supra note 20, at 897.
98. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Lewis, No. 1:11-cv-01811-JLT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50638, at
*17 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2014) (utilizing the “frolic and detour” defense but ultimately having the
enhancements upheld).
99. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
100. See CAL. LEGIS., AB 109, 2011–2012, Reg. Sess. (2011).
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governments with more power to determine sentencing;101 in 2014,
Proposition 47 passed, which re-classified several non-violent and
drug felonies as misdemeanors.102 Then, in 2016, Californians passed
Proposition 57, which opened up the possibility of parole for a wide
population of non-violent offenders who had previously been
ineligible.103 In 2017, a bill passed reforming CalGang.104 In 2018, the
California legislature passed a number of criminal justice reform
bills—including the end of cash bail, an increase in judicial discretion
over sentencing, and the elimination of felony murder.105 But even
during a decade of change, the California legislature barely touched
the STEP Act, choosing instead to tweak the bill in non-consequential
ways.106
The most consequential change for those charged with gang
enhancements was the shift in the composition of the California
Supreme Court after Albillar. Between 2011 and 2019, five new
justices were appointed to the California Supreme Court.107
Far from the death-penalty-loving court of old, the new justices
appeared far more reform-oriented. Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye led
the cash-bail reform effort.108 Justice Florentino-Cuéllar spent time in
the Obama administration working on a host of legislation.109 Justice
Liu wrote a law review article arguing for the constitutional right to
welfare.110 Justice Groban, the most recent addition to the court,

101. Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Public Safety Realignment: Impacts So Far, PUB.
POL’Y INST. CAL. (Sept. 2015), https://www.ppic.org/publication/public-safety-realignmentimpacts-so-far/.
102. Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, CAL. CTS.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/prop47.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
103. The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS &
REHABILITATION, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/proposition57/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34 (West 2018).
105. California Governor Signs Many Criminal Justice Changes into Law, S. CAL. DEF. BLOG
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.southerncaliforniadefenseblog.com/2018/11/california-governorsigns-many-criminal-justice-changes-into-law.html.
106. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (Deering 2007).
107. Scott Shafer, Brown’s Longest-Lasting Legacy: Judges, KQED (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11714131/browns-longest-lasting-legacy-judges.
108. Marisa Lagos, California Chief Justice: Bail Reform Process ‘Unassailable’, KQED
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11690832/california-chief-justice-bail-reformprocess-unassailable.
109. See
Associate
Justice
Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar,
CAL.
CTS.,
https://www.courts.ca.gov/28724.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
110. See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203
(2008).
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worked on a number of policies for Governor Jerry Brown.111 These
changes meant the people deciding Valenzuela differed significantly
from those deciding Gardeley, and even Albillar.
VI. VALENZUELA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. The Road to Valenzuela
That will take us, momentarily, to Valenzuela. But before
discussion of that case, some important foundation must be laid.
Valenzuela reconciled three key developments in California
jurisprudence: In re Estrada,112 Proposition 47, and People v.
Buycks.113
In re Estrada, decided in 1965, created the modern rule
concerning the retroactivity of statutes reducing punishments for
certain crimes.114 In Estrada, the court answered a fundamental
question: when a statute is amended before a defendant’s case closes,
does the statute at the time of the crime or the statute at the time of the
case’s appeal control?115 Estrada definitively declared that defendants
were entitled to the “ameliorating benefits” of the amendment,
provided the case has not closed.116
Estrada rose to prominence again in 2014 when the California
electorate passed Proposition 47.117 Proposition 47 amended the
California Penal Code and reduced a number of felonies to
misdemeanors.118 Proposition 47 expressly provided a mechanism for
defendants to apply for re-sentencing and felony-to-misdemeanor
reduction.119 What Proposition 47 did not address, however, was what
would become of specific enhancements that required felony
convictions.
111. Bob Egelko, Jerry Brown’s Legacy: Diversifying the Judicial Bench, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 3,
2019, 07:28 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Jerry-Brown-s-legacy-diversifyingthe-judicial-13507344.php.
112. 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1965).
113. 422 P.3d 531 (Cal. 2018).
114. In re Estrada, 408 P.2d at 950.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 951 (illustrating that a case pending appeal is not considered closed).
117. See Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, supra note 102; see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(b) (West 2019). The petitioner in Valenzuela was resentenced under
California Penal Code section 1170.18(b), based on the changes enacted by Proposition 47. People
v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 899 (Cal. 2019)).
118. See Proposition 47: The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, supra note 102.
119. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.18(b).
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Enter 2018’s Buycks. There, three defendants successfully
reduced their felonies to misdemeanors via the mechanisms created by
Proposition 47.120 At play in Buycks were three separate
enhancements:121 California Penal Code section 667.5, part of
California’s infamous “three strikes” law;122 California Penal Code
subsection 12022.1(b), which added two extra years for additional
felonies committed while on bail;123 and California Penal Code section
1320.5, which declared, “Every person who is charged with or
convicted of the commission of a felony, who is released from custody
on bail, and who in order to evade the process of the court willfully
fails to appear as required, is guilty of a felony.”124
The Buycks court dismissed the enhancements brought under
section 667.5 and subsection 12011.1(b), while upholding the
enhancement brought under section 1320.5.125 The key distinction laid
in “plain reading” text of the statute—section 1320.5 only required a
felony charge whereas the other two required felony convictions.126
Because Proposition 47 reduced the necessary felony convictions to
misdemeanors, the court determined the enhancements lacked a
critical element and dismissed them.127
B. People v. Valenzuela
Then, People v. Valenzuela arrived. There, a young defendant
stole a $200 bicycle.128 The jury convicted the defendant on two
grounds: grand theft and the STEP Act.129 While the case was on
appeal, Proposition 47 passed, and the defendant successfully
petitioned to reduce his grand theft felony to a misdemeanor.130
This brought the California Supreme Court to a crucial question:
with the felony charge no longer present, could the conviction under
the STEP Act stand? The case turned on the phrasing of a key
requirement in the statute: the defendant must assist in “any felonious
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 535 (Cal. 2018).
Id. at 536–37.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 2019).
Id. § 12022.1 (West Supp. 2019).
Id. § 1320.5 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
Buycks, 422 P.3d at 547–49.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 547–49.
People v. Valenzuela, 441 P.3d 896, 899 (Cal. 2019).
Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2014).
Valenzuela, 441 P.3d at 899–900.
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criminal conduct by members of that gang.”131 The State argued the
term “conduct” did not require that the defendant be convicted of a
felony.132 It also stressed that the legal classification of the crime at
the time it was committed controlled the outcome of the sentencing.133
The Valenzuela court disagreed. The court determined that the
stand-alone conviction under the STEP Act required the “conduct” to
be felonious—and since the theft was now a misdemeanor, it was by
definition no longer felonious.134 The court likened the felony
conviction requirement of the Buycks statutes to the felonious conduct
requirement of the STEP Act; to the court, these were one and the
same requirement.135 Since the defendant’s theft was reduced to a
misdemeanor and, by definition, was no longer felonious, the STEP
Act conviction lacked a critical element.136
The court added another wrinkle: if a prosecutor wanted to argue
that the conduct furthered a felony committed by the gang, even if the
defendant’s actions themselves were only worthy of a misdemeanor,
then the prosecutor would have to draw the causal link between the
misdemeanor and a specific, identified felony committed by the
gang.137 In effect, the prosecution’s burden would soon become twofold: to not only prove a misdemeanor beyond a reasonable doubt, but
to prove that misdemeanor assisted in a specific felony committed by
other gang members.138
The court also declared that Estrada’s ameliorative effects
trumped the State’s second argument.139 In doing so, the court noted
that “no indicia of legislative intent” concerning the STEP Act
indicated a felony was “fixed for all time when the crime takes
place.”140 As such, Estrada controlled, and the defendant deserved the
precedent’s ameliorative effects.141
The dissenting opinions provide fuller context for why
Valenzuela is distinguishable from other California Supreme Court
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (emphasis added).
Valenzuela, 441 P.3d at 904.
Id. at 904–05.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 904 n.5.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id.
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decisions regarding gang enhancements. Justice Corrigan took the
opposite stance of the majority. Instead of equating felonious conduct
to a felony conviction, Justice Corrigan argued that the defendant’s
actions “promot[ed]” the defendant’s gang—a standard Justice
Corrigan felt satisfied the requirement under the STEP Act for a standalone conviction, even if the crime that promoted the gang was itself
reduced to a misdemeanor.142 In addition, she pointed out that
Proposition 47 was not specifically designed to address crimes under
the STEP Act and that doing so expanded the reach of the Proposition
in a “random and haphazard” way.143
Justice Kruger took issue with the court’s use of Estrada in her
dissenting opinion.144 She noted that at no point did the defense raise
an Estrada defense.145 In fact, she pointed out, the defendant
“affirmatively disclaimed reliance on this theory.”146
C. The Result
It is not difficult to see the California Supreme Court of the 1990s
agreeing with Justice Corrigan’s decision to distinguish Buycks. The
same court that wrote Gardeley and Castenada would also likely find
the Valenzuela court’s use of Estrada suspect.
Yet, Valenzuela represents a modest step that will likely only
assist a small number of defendants. At the end of the day, the STEP
Act has been amended and historically interpreted in such a punitive
way that modest, reform-oriented decisions like Valenzuela are likely
the only real victories for criminal defendants.
VII. CONCLUSION
And that is only if there are victories at all. It is possible that
California politics and judicial decisions remain firmly rooted in
pursuit of criminal justice reform for the foreseeable future. Yet, that
may change. A new current of punitive justice may once again spring
up and take the judiciary with it.
It also remains puzzling that, even with public defenders,
prosecutors, and the state government acknowledging the systemic
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 907 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 911 (Kruger, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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issues in evaluating gang prosecutions, little action has been taken to
address the issue. Instead, gang prosecutions remain in stasis—where
small, modest steps like Valenzuela shift the tide only a little.
Reform appears necessary. To start, California legislators would
do well to bring the STEP Act back in line with its original intent. At
the moment, it serves as a blunt instrument rather than a careful
deterrent against serious gang members.
There are a number of statutory reforms that could aid in that
endeavor. To start, a statutorily defined explanation of “felonious
criminal conduct” and a prohibition on using charged, but unproven,
offenses as the basis for establishing gang prosecutions would aid
significantly.147
Next, the California legislature must reduce the number of
“serious” crimes available. With thirty-three enumerated offenses, it
is too easy for graffiti artists or raucous kids to be slammed with harsh
penalties.148
In addition, the Act should permit more judicial discretion in
enhancement sentencing.149 Reducing mandatory punishments and
providing judges with a spectrum of available sentences would ensure
that the only worst offenders are punished with the maximum
sentences.
Finally, due to the extremely prejudicial nature of gang evidence,
the California legislature should adopt language making the
bifurcation of gang enhancements or gang prosecutions the norm. It
can do so by clearly distinguishing the type of specific gang evidence
that is always necessary, even in a “trial of guilt” that is otherwise not
involved in a prosecution for gang activity.150 These modifications
would scratch the surface of what reform could look like.
The Valenzuela court did well by the defendant, and the likely
small population of defendants situated similarly. But the fact that
Valenzuela can so significantly depart from cases like Gardeley—less
than twenty-five years later—speaks to the need for clarity on the
matter. In order to bring about reform that helps those affected by gang
violence while also respecting the rights of the criminally accused, a
new, bottom-up framework is required. Judicial half-steps and tweaks
147.
148.
149.
150.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 2014).
Id. § 186.22(e).
Id. § 186.22(b)(1)(A)–(C).
People v. Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1086 (Cal. 2004).
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are no longer enough. Real reform requires new efforts on both the
electoral and legislative fronts.

